| Abstract |
|
Malicious boot firmware is a largely unrecognized but
significant security risk to our global information infrastructure.
Since boot firmware executes before the operating
system is loaded, it can easily circumvent any operating
system-based security mechanism. Boot firmware programs
are typically written by third-party device manufacturers
and may come from various suppliers of unknown origin. In
this paper we describe an approach to this problem based
on load-time verification of onboard device drivers against
a standard security policy designed to limit access to system
resources. We also describe our ongoing effort to construct
a prototype of this technique for Open Firmware boot platforms.
|
 Additional Information
|
Citation:
Frank Adelstein, Matt Stillerman, Dexter Kozen,
"Malicious Code Detection for Open Firmware,"
acsac,
p. 403,
18th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC '02),
2002
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