| Abstract |
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In order to succeed, agents playing games must reason about
the mechanics of the game, the strategies of other agents,
other agents’ reasoning about their strategies, and the rationality
of agents. This paper presents a compact, natural
and highly expressive language for reasoning about the beliefs
and rationality of agents’ decision-making processes in
games. It extends a previous version of the language in
a number of important ways. Agents can reason directly
about the rationality of other agents; agents’ beliefs are allowed
to conflict with one another, including situations in
which these beliefs form a cyclic structure; agents’ play can
deviate from the normative game theoretic solution. The
paper formalizes the equilibria that holds with respect to
agents’ models and behavior, and provides algorithms for
computing it. It also shows that the language is strictly
more expressive than that of Bayesian games.
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 Additional Information
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Index Terms- Computing Methodologies, Artificial Intelligence, Languages, Decision-making under uncertainty, Game theory, Opponent modeling
Citation:
Ya’akov Gal, Avi Pfeffer,
"Reasoning about Rationality and Beliefs,"
aamas,
pp. 774-781,
Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2 (AAMAS'04),
2004
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