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Published Articles >> Table of Contents >> Abstract
Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2 (AAMAS'04)
pp. 580-587
On Safe Kernel Stable Coalition Forming among Agents
Bastian Blankenburg, German Research Center for Artifical Intelligence, Deduction and Multiagent Systems
Matthias Klusch, German Research Center for Artifical Intelligence, Deduction and Multiagent Systems
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DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/AAMAS.2004.10107
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| Abstract |
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We investigate and discuss safety and privacy preserving
properties of a game-theortic based coalition algorithm
KCA for forming kernel stable coalitions among information
agents in face of imperfect information on actual coalition
values, and changing agent society. In addition, we analyze
the chances of deceiving information agents to succeed
in coalition negotiations using the KCA protocol. We
show that a certain type of fraud which leads to an increase
of individual profit can neither be prevented nor detected,
but this comes at the expense of exponentially high computation
costs for the deceiving agent.
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Additional Information
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Citation:
Bastian Blankenburg, Matthias Klusch,
"On Safe Kernel Stable Coalition Forming among Agents,"
aamas,
pp. 580-587,
Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2 (AAMAS'04),
2004
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