| Abstract |
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We introduce a Game Logic with Preferences (GLP),
which makes it possible to reason about how information
or assumptions about the preferences of other players can
be used by agents in order to realize their own preferences.
GLP can be applied to the analysis of social protocols such
as voting or fair division problems; we illustrate this use of
GLP with a number of worked examples. We then prove that
the model checking problem for GLP is tractable, and describe
an implemented model checker for the logic — by using
the model checker, it is possible to automate the analysis
and verification of social protocols.
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 Additional Information
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Citation:
Sieuwert van Otterloo, Wiebe van der Hoek, Michael Wooldridge,
"Preferences in Game Logics,"
aamas,
pp. 152-159,
Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1 (AAMAS'04),
2004
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